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ARTICLES
THE VIDEOTAPE RENTAL
CONTROVERSY: COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT OR MARKET
NECESSITY?*
JULIE KANE-RITSCH**
INTRODUCTION

The home video recorder industry, virtually nonexistent when
the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed,' today constitutes a substantial consumer market. Over five million households now own video
recorders ("VCR's"), with projected growth to thirty-five million by

1990.2 To utilize the full potential of this new market, major motion picture studios released their films on prerecorded tapes in
1977. 3 Retail prices for these tapes ranged from $45 to $75.4 Because consumers were reluctant to pay such high prices to purchase

a single film, video retail stores started renting the prerecorded

tapes. 5 Tape rentals were expressly prohibited by restrictive legends placed on the tape. 6 Video stores, however, ignored the restrictions and earned $250 million on prerecorded tape rentals in

1981.

7

* Received first place in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Writing
Competition 1984, De Paul University College of Law.
** J.D., 1984, De Paul University College of Law; Associate, Reuben &
Proctor, Chicago, Illinois.
1. The first year of significant video recorder sales occurred in 1976. At
the end of 1976, 50,000 VCR's had been sold. Nolty, Matsushita Takes the Lead
in Video Recorders, FORTUNE, July 16, 1979, at 54.
2. The Big Bucks at Stake When Titans Clash, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
March 7, 1983, at 51.
3. Oversight of the Copyright Act of 1976: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (July 29, 1981) (testimony of
Stephen Roberts, President, Twentieth Century Fox Telecommunications Division) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Stephen Roberts].
4. Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearings on S.
1758 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1070 (1982)
(prepared statement of John Power, Executive Director, American Video Association) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of John Power].
5. Id.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 79-87.
7. Copyright Infringements (Audio and Video Recorders): Hearings on S.
1758 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 692 (1982)
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These prerecorded videotapes are included within the subject
matter capable of copyright protection under the Copyright Act of
1976.8 The Act, however, is silent on whether the rental of prerecorded tapes constitutes infringement. In analyzing this question,
two provisions of the Act offer general guidance. Section 109(a)
provides that once a first sale of a legally copyrighted work occurs,
the copyright owner parts with title and control over his work. 9
Thus, any lawful purchaser can use or dispose of the copyrighted
article as he or she sees fit.'0 The first sale doctrine, however, has
one significant limitation. Even with a first sale, the copyright
owner retains the power to control a public performance of his or
her work under section 106(4)." The interpretation of these two
provisions will determine whether the rental of prerecorded videotapes violates the Copyright Act of 1976.
Case law interpretation of video-related issues, however, has
been minimal. Because the Act lacks specific language pertaining
to the use of VCRs and prerecorded tapes, the courts have been reluctant to rule on video-related issues. In fact, it took the United
States Supreme Court two sessions to decide whether home taping
for private use of over-the-air television broadcasts constituted infringement of the Copyright Act. In Sony Corporationof America
12
v. Universal Studios, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Betamax),
the Court eventually held that the home taping practice was a noninfringing "fair use" under the Act, although the Court called for
congressional aid and clarification. 1 3 No subsequent case has yet
(statement of Elmer Cooper, Chairman, and Stewart Eizenstadt, Counsel, Committee Against Regulation of Video Enterprises) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Elmer Cooper].

8. The Comments to the Copyright Act of 1976 state that the definition of
a motion picture includes "cinematographic works embodied in films, tapes,
video disks, and other media." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56
(1976). [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
9. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 43-71.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982). The definition of a public performance is explained in section 101. Id. at § 101. For a full discussion of the public performance doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 37-40, 97-117.
12. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). For discussion and analysis of the lower court
opinions, see generally Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.

REV. 1600 (1982) (argues that fair use is an appropriate analysis in home videotaping cases because the market will fail to deliver the copyrighted works to the
consumer if he or she is forced to negotiate agreements for the use of protected
work); Nimmer, CopyrightLiabilityfor Audio Home Recording. Dispellingthe
Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505 (1982) (criticizes the Betamax decision and

argues that audio recording is neither exempt nor fair use under the Copyright
Act of 1976, and thus, should be controlled through royalties assessed against
manufacturers of home recording equipment).
13. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 796. The Court observed that:
One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected
representatives

. . .

have made it unlawful to copy a [television] program

1985]

Videotape Rentals

addressed the question of whether the rental of prerecorded video14
tapes constitutes a copyright infringement.
The motion picture studios, video store retail owners, and consumers have taken the approach urged by the Supreme Court in
Betamax. The videotape rental issue has been presented to Congress for resolution. A bill, pending in both houses, would amend
the Act's first sale provision and make the rental of prerecorded
copyrighted videotapes an infringement of copyright law.15 Another proposed amendment would clarify the public performance
16
provision of the Act to include rental of prerecorded videotapes.
Both amendments present alternatives worthy of analysis and
consideration.
This article explains the first sale and public performance sec17
tions of the Act, including the legislative history and case law.
Next, this article analyzes the enforceability of the motion picture
studio's practice of placing restrictive legends on tapes under the
Copyright Act.' 8 Then this article discusses the proposed amendments to the first sale doctrine and public performance sections of
the Act. 19
Even if the amendments are enacted, the motion picture studios lack an effective way to collect royalties or license fees on tape
rentals. Single studio monitoring, attempted in the early 1980's,
failed because of market resistance. 20 While a performing rights society presents an efficient and workable model for collecting royalty fees, studio practices must still comply with prior anti-trust
decisions on blanket licensing. 21 Compulsory licenses are suggested
22
as a practical means of resolving the royalty collection problem.
Finally, past studio marketing decisions are criticized. The studios
set tape sales prices by calculating the number of times a film will
be rented. Recouping rental royalty fees in the sales price has
for later viewing at home ....
It may well be that Congress will take a
fresh look at this new technology . .. [but] it is not our job to apply laws
that have not yet been written.

Id.
14. Hearings on Home Recording of Copyrighted Works before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice of the Comm.
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
15. S. 33, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1027, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
16. Testimony of Stephen Roberts, supra note 3, at 323. For a full discussion
of the proposed public performance amendment, see infra text accompanying
notes 123-25.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 43-71, 97-117.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 80, 85-91.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 118-25.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 81-84, 139-48.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 144-217.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 217-31.
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placed tape purchases beyond the means of most consumers. This
paper posits that meeting consumer demands for low cost tapes
23
presents a feasible solution to the videotape rental controversy.
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

The United States Constitution provides Congress with the
power to enact copyright laws. The Constitution states that Congress is empowered to "promote the progress of science and useful
arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. '24 The
philosophy underlying the Copyright Act is to encourage individuals to be creative and to advance the welfare of society by offering
artists and creators an economic incentive. 25 This economic incentive involves the right to control the use of their work for a limited
time.26 By placing a time limit on an artist's exclusive control over
economic benefits from his work, Congress met the constitutional
mandate that creative works be made available to the general pub27
lic so that the free flow of ideas and information is not hindered.
The Act clearly gives videotaped works copyright protection.
Section 102(a) provides seven categories of authorship protected by
the Act. 28 Motion pictures and other audio-visual works are listed
in the sixth category. 29 In the comments to the Act, the definition
of a "motion picture" includes three elements:
(1) a series of images, (2) the capability of showing the images in
certain successive order, and (3) an impression of motion when the
images are thus shown .... [T]his definition encompasses a wide

works embodied in films, tapes, video disks,
range of cinematographic
30
and other media.
Thus, copyrighted motion pictures recorded on videotape31 are eligible for all the rights and remedies provided by the Act.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 232-38.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
25. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
26. The general rule under the Act is that a copyright lasts for the life of
the author plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). Under the 1909 Copyright
Act, protection ran for 28 years from the date of publication. 17 U.S.C. § 24
(1909).
27. Goldstein, Copyright and the FirstAmendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983,
1006 (1970).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). The seven categories of works of authorship
are literary works; musical works, including lyrics; dramatic works, including
any music accompanying the work; pantomimed and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; and sound recordings. Id.
29. Id.
30. House Report, supra note 8, at 56.
31. Rights of copyright owners are defined in section 106. 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1982). These rights include the right to reproduce copies, prepare derivative
works, distribute copies, perform the work publicly, or publicly display the
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Specifically, the Act gives a copyright owner the power to "distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending." 32 Once the copyright owner exercises his right to sell a
lawfully produced copy of his work, however, he parts with the
33
right to restrict the purchaser's future use or sale of the work.
Section 109(a) provides, under the first sale doctrine, that a purchaser is entitled "without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord. ' 34 Thus, a lawful purchaser can transfer the copy to
someone else, or even destroy the copy. Because of the first sale
doctrine, a library can lend a legally acquired copy of a book on
whatever terms it chooses without infringing on the author or publisher's copyright. 35 The copyright owner, however, may have a
state law remedy if the purchaser's use of the copyrighted article is
36
limited by the terms of the sale contract.
Despite the copyright owner's loss of control over a copyrighted
work after a first sale, the owner of such a work retains the right to
control any public performance of it. Section 106(4) provides that
the copyright owner always retains the exclusive right to publicly
perform the copyrighted motion picture or other audio-visual
work. 37 The comments to the Act stress that film, videotape, and
video disks are included in the definition of works subject to this
38
copyright protection.
As defined in section 101 of the Act, a "performance" of a motion picture or other audio-visual work means "to show its images
39
in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.
work. Id. Remedies are provided in sections 501 to 510. 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-10
(1982). For a discussion of remedies provided by the Act, see infra text accompanying notes 130-39.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
33. This doctrine was set forth by the Second Circuit in 1894. The court
stated that once a copy of a copyrighted work is sold, "the ordinary incidents of
ownership in personal property, among which is the right of alienation, attach
to it." Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill and Co., 61 F. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894) (quoting with approval Henry Bill Pub. Co. v. Smyth, 27 F. 914 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886)).
For further discussion of the first sale doctrine, see infra text accompanying
notes 43-71.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982).
35. House Report, supra note 8, at 79.
36. Id. For further discussion of state law breach of contract remedies, see
infra text accompanying notes 87-89, 94-96.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982). The section states that a copyright owner is
authorized "in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimed, and motion pictures and their audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly." Id.
38. House Report, supra note 8, at 63.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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The Act provides that a public performance includes the following
actions:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle
of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered, or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of
the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same 40place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times.
Therefore, if any act by a purchaser of a legally copyrighted work
under the first sale doctrine constitutes a public performance, he or
she is liable for infringement unless the copyright owner's permission to perform the work is obtained.
Within the videotape rental controversy, retail owners maintain they are free of any restrictive legends and may dispose of the
prerecorded tapes by virtue of the first sale doctrine. 41 The motion
picture studios claim that the restrictive legends contractually limit
the uses a retail video store may make of the prerecorded tapes.
Alternatively, they argue that the rental of prerecorded videotapes
constitutes an infringing public performance of the copyrighted
42
videotape.
FIRST SALE ISSUES
The Doctrine and Case Law

The general rule that a valid first sale divests a copyright
owner's power to limit the purchaser's subsequent use of the copyrighted article was established in Harrison v. Maynard Merrill &
Co..43 The corollary rule is that if no valid first sale occurred, all
future dispositions of the copyrighted work are infringements
which violate the Act. 44 Answering the question of whether a first

sale has occurred is not an easy task. As the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania observed, transfers of copyrighted
45
works are often accomplished through complicated arrangements.
40. Id.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 43-71.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 72-117.
43. 61 F. 689, 691 (1894). The Harrisoncase was decided under the first sale
provisions of the Copyright Act of 1870.
44. Henry Bill Publishing Co. v. Smythe, 27 F. 914, 921 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886)
(an agent, authorized by the copyright owner to sell books directly to subscribers, was liable for infringement when he sold books to a bookseller because the
copies had been obtained through an agency arrangement rather than a first
sale).
45. United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (in a criminal
copyright infringement case, defendant argued that the indictment should be
quashed because the films he possessed had previously been sold).
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Thus, the court "must analyze the arrangement at issue to decide
whether [the arrangement] should be considered a first sale" or a
46
license.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directly addressed
the question of whether a transfer of possession established a valid
first sale in Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics,Inc.47 In that

case, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant to have its copyrighted toys manufactured by defendant. Defendant threatened to
sell the defective toys to mitigate damages, but plaintiff warned him
that any sale would constitute a copyright infringement. Plaintiff
then sought to enjoin the defendant from selling the defective copyrighted toys.

48

The Second Circuit held in favor of plaintiff and granted the
injunction. 49 In construing the first sale provision of the Copyright
Act, the court observed that the copyright owner could not restrict
the purchaser's use of lawfully obtained copyrighted articles. 50 The
court stated, however, that mere lawful possession of a copyrighted
work did not qualify as a first sale under the Act. 51 Since the defendant only had possession of the copyrighted toys, and not title,
any sales of the toys without plaintiff's consent was an infringement
52
upon plaintiff's copyright.
The possession versus title analysis of Platt & Munk was redefined by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Wise. 53 The Wise
46. Id.
47. 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963).
48. Id. at 849-50.
49. Id. at 855.
50. Id. at 851. The court interpreted section 27 of the Copyright Act of 1909.
Section 27 of the 1909 Act stated that "nothing in this title shall be deemed to
forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work, the
possession of which has been lawfully obtained." 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1909).
Although the language of the 1976 Act is different, see supra text accompanying note 33, the comments to the 1976 Act indicate that the judicial gloss of
section 27 is incorporated into the first sale doctrine of the 1976 Act. House
Report, supra note 8, at 79. Professor Melville B. Nimmer also concludes that
the current section 109 simply restates the former section 27. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.12(B), at 8-119 (1983).
51. Platt & Munk, 315 F.2d at 852. The court observed that the first sale
doctrine "[had] never been regarded by the courts as terminating the proprietor's control over the sale of a copyrighted object merely by virtue of his having
allowed another person to obtain lawful possession of it." Id.
52. Id.
53. 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977). A contrary result was reached in United
States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630 (S.D. Tex. 1959). In Wells, the copyright
owner, Tobin, granted over a hundred licensees the right to make duplicate copies of his maps. Defendant Wells, not a licensee, sold a map bearing Tobin's
copyright. The court reviewed the agreement between Tobin and his licensees
and found that first sale had occurred because Tobin did not expressly reserve
title to the maps. Id. at 634.
Most courts, however, adopt the approach of the Wise court and look to the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. In Hampton v. Paramount Pic-
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court held that failure of the copyright owner to reserve title did
not create the presumption that a first sale had occurred. 54 The
defendant in Wise was charged with seven counts of criminal copyright infringement. 55 The jury convicted defendant on six counts,
but found on one count that a valid first sale had occurred. The
56
court of appeals affirmed four of the six convictions.
The defendant in Wise owned the "Hollywood Film Exchange," where he sold feature length motion pictures and openly
advertised and solicited sales. 57 Evidence presented by the motion
picture studios detailed the transactions concerning each of the six
films found in defendant's possession,5 8 and the government bore
the burden of proving that none of the feature length films had
59
been sold outright.
tures, the court looked to all the terms of the contract to determine if a first sale
or a license had occurred. 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960). Because the contract
contained no time limits on use of the film, a flat sum payment for use, and no
provisions for the film's return, the court found that a valid license existed. Id.
at 103. Therefore, the licensee was restricted to the uses specified in the license.
Id.
54. Wise, 550 F.2d at 1191.
55. Defendant was prosecuted under section 104 of the 1909 Act. 17 U.S.C.
§ 104 (1909). The provision stated that willful infringement of a copyright for
profit could be punished by imprisonment of up to one year or fines between
$100 and $1,000. Id. This provision is recodified in section 506 of the 1976 Act.
17 U.S.C. § 506 (1982). The penalties for willful infringement of a copyright for
commercial gain were increased to $10,000 fine or one year in prison, or both.
Id. at § 506(a).
56. Wise, 550 F.2d at 1183.
57. Id. at 1183-84.
58. The six films in question were "The Exorcist," "Camelot," "Forty Carats," "Funny Girl," "The Sting," "American Graffitti," and "Paper Moon." Id.
at 1183 n.1. The studios established that the only time 35 m.m. prints of the
films were sold directly was to salvage companies when the prints became worn
and unuseable. Id. at 1192. In the salvaging process, 250 foot sections of feature
length films were sent to salvage companies in batches containing only parts of
each feature film. The salvage companies either wash and scratch the film to
produce blank leader, burn black and white film to recover silver, or grind up
color film for sale to plastics companies. Id. at 1192-93. The evidence established that no feature film could be reconstructed from salvage pieces. Id. at
1193. Thus, defendant did not obtain his prints from salvage company reconstruction of the film. Id.
59. Under section 104 of the 1909 Act, the courts placed the burden of showing absence of a first sale on the government. Id. at 1190. This created a presumption that the defendant had legally acquired the copy under a valid first
sale. See United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1977) (government's
evidence failed to establish absence of a first sale); United States v. Drebin, 557
F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977) (conviction affirmed because defendant was authorized
to rent films, and selling films was a violation of the license agreement); United
States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (restates the rule that the burden
of showing absence of a first sale is on the government); American Int'l Pictures
v. Foreman, 400 F. Supp. 928 (S.D. Ala. 1975) (because the government failed to
show chain of title, defendant was entitled to presumption of lawful possession),
rev'd, 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Copyright Act of 1976 changes the old rule and places the burden of
showing lawful possession of the copyrighted work on the defendant. House
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Evidence established that the films were loaned to stars in four
VIP agreements, or were licensed to theatres. The studios claimed
that no films were sold outright. 60 Three of the VIP loan agreements reviewed by the trial court expressly stated that the license
included a copying prohibition, a right of limited exhibition, and a
set time for return.61 The court also reviewed the licensing agreements between the studios and the exhibitors. The court found that
the "mere failure to expressly reserve title

. . .

does not require a

finding that the films were sold, where the general tenor of the entire agreement is inconsistent with such a conclusion. '62 Thus, the
court affirmed four of the six convictions on the basis that no first
sale had occurred and the defendant had obtained the copies
illegally.

63

As the cases of Platt & Munk and Wise indicate, a purchaser
under a first sale acquires the right to dispose of or use the copyrighted work as one so desires. This conclusion is not altered by
contract terms which restrict the purchaser's use of the copyrighted
article after the first sale. In Harrisonv. Maynard Merrill & Co.,64
the court held that the Copyright Act could not be used to enforce
contract restrictions when that contract met the tests to qualify as a
Report, supra note 8, at 80-81. This view was endorsed, albeit under the 1909
version of the Act, on the appeal of the Foreman case. American Int'l Pictures
v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978). Criminal copyright infringement actions under the 1976 Act have not yet reached the trial stage. See United States
v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1982) (motion to quash search warrant denied);
United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1981) (motion to suppress seized
tapes on the basis of an invalid search warrant). Thus, the courts have not yet
developed case law, under the new Act, which clearly places the burden of
showing a valid first sale on the defendant.
See generally Beard, The Sale, Rental and Reproduction of Motion Picture
Videocassettes: Piracy and Privilege?, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 435, 472-83 (1979)
(analysis of burden of proof in criminal infringement cases and criticism of the
House Report); Nevins, The Film Collector, The FBI, and The CopyrightAct, 26
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 547 (1977) (analysis of government prosecution of criminal
infringement cases under the 1909 Act).
60. Under a VIP agreement, copies of feature films are loaned to studio
heads, producers, or movie stars for homeviewing. Wise, 550 F.2d at 1192.
Licenses were granted to exhibitors for limited purposes of displaying the film.
Id. at 1190.
61. VIP agreements were made for "The Sting," "Paper Moon," "Funny
Girl," and "Camelot." The court found that the transaction providing Vanessa
Redgrave with a copy of "Camelot" constituted a sale with restrictions on use of
the print. Id. at 1192. With respect to "Camelot," the government failed to
show absence of a first sale. The conviction was reversed on this count. Id.
62. Id. at 1191. The only license agreement indicating that a sale had occurred was between ABC and Screen Gems for "Funny Girl." Because the
agreement permitted ABC to retain a file copy for screening, the court found a
first sale had occurred. Thus, defendant's conviction for possession of "Funny
Girl" was reversed. Id. at 1191-92.
63. Id. at 1193-94.
64. 61 F. 689 (2d Cir. 1894).

294
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first sale. 65 The case involved a copyright owner who sent sheets of

a manuscript to a binder for storage until additional copies of the
book were needed. The contract prohibited the binder from selling
any damaged books. A fire in the bindery damaged the manuscript
pages. The binder sold the ruined pages to a waste dealer under a
contract containing the restrictive legend. The defendant, a secondhand book-dealer, obtained copies containing the damaged pages.
Defendant had no knowledge of plaintiff's restriction against selling the damaged books, and sold the defective copies. 66 The Court
found that a first sale occurred and that the defendant could dispose
67
of the books.
The Supreme Court held that a first sale made contract restrictions unenforceable as a matter of copyright law in Bobbs-Merrill
Co. v. Straus.68 Plaintiff owned the copyright to a novel entitled
"The Castaways." The copyright legend stated that the retail price
must be $1.00, that no dealer was licensed to sell for less, and that
sale for under $1.00 constituted infringement. 69 The Court found
that the first sale occurred when the plaintiff sold the novel to the
distributor. Ruling that no privity of contract existed between the
plaintiff and defendant retailer, the Court held that the Copyright
Act could not be used to enforce the contractual restriction. 70 A
state breach of contract remedy, however, would still be available to
71
the copyright owner under state law.
Studio Use of Restrictive Legends and Rental Only Schemes
The motion picture studios first released feature films on prerecorded videotapes (tapes) in 1977.72 Copyright owners received
fifteen to thirty percent of the wholesale price of the tape as a roy65. Id. at 691. As a general rule courts disfavor contractual restraints on
alienation. See generally Lewson, The Videotape Rental Controversy, 30 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y. 1, 17-24 (1982).
66. Harrison, 61 F. at 689.

67. Id. at 691. See also Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3rd
Cir. 1961) (comic book publisher could not enforce restrictive legend requiring
wholesale dealers to destroy unsold comic books when wholesaler never informed the scrap dealer of the restrictive legend).
68. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
69. Id. at 341.
70. Id. at 350. The Court stated:
In this case the stipulated facts show that the books sold by the appellant
were sold at wholesale, and purchased by those who made no agreement as
to the control of future sales of the book, and took upon themselves no
obligation to enforce the notice printed in the book, undertaking to restrict
retail sales to a price of one dollar per copy.
Id.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88.
72. Sales of videotapes and videodiscs now provide a substantial amount of
revenue to the motion picture industry. Sales of tapes accounted for 13 percent
of all gross movie revenues, an increase of 5 percent from 1982 figures. Bowden,
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alty. 7 3

A typical sixty dollar tape, therefore, usually returned an
eight dollar royalty fee to the copyright owner. 74 Under this plan,
the studio made its profit, the copyright owner of the film received
his royalty, and the consumer received a chance to view a film in his
home. 75 The studios released tapes of their films with the belief
that their royalty revenues were protected under the public performance section of the Act.

76

Video retail store owners had a different view of the law.
Looking to the first sale doctrine, they believed that a purchase of a
tape freed it from the copyright owner's control.7 7 Thus, the retail-

ers met the growing consumer demand for reasonably priced tapes
by renting tapes to VCR owners. By 1981, over 25,000 video retailMovies on Tape Reel in the Profits, St. Petersburg Times, May 13, 1984, § E
(Arts/Travel), at 1E.
73. Testimony of Stephen Roberts, supra note 3, at 318.
74. Id. at 319. In support of his statements, Mr. Roberts submitted the following chart:
RENTAL PLUS SALE
SALES ONLY
CASE #1
CASE #2
Retail Sale Price
Rental Price
Number of Rentals
Retail Rental Revenue
Gross Revenue to Retailer
Wholesale Cost of Video
Cassette/Gross Revenue to
Manufacturer-Distributor
Gross Royalty Revenue to
Copyright Owner
Guild/Union Membership
Participation

$60
0
$60

$ 40
$ 5
12
$ 60
$100

$ 29
$ 6
20
$120
$149

$40

$ 40

$ 40

$ 8

$

8

$

8

$ 1

$

1

$

1

-

Id. at 319.
75. Frank Barnako testified that in 1982, movie studios made 150 percent on
sales of tapes to distributors. Distributors made 15 percent on their sales to
retailers. Thus, typical prices were a movie studio cost of $20, sales of $42 to $48
to distributors, and $50 to $60 to retailers. Hearings on Home Recording of
Copyrighted Works before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 746 (1983) (testimony of Frank Barnako,
President, Video Software Dealer's Association) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings: Frank Barnako].
Today many tapes are selling at retail for $39.98. The retailer is charged
$29.95 for the tape. Commtron Corp. Video Tape Price List, Effective 2/01/84,
at 38. If the above proportions still hold true, distributors are charged $25.00
and studios produce the tapes for about $8.00. Thus royalties would be approximately $2.40 per tape. Tape sales, however, increase with reduced retail sales
prices. See infra text accompanying note 234.
76. Hearings on Home Recording of Copyrighted Works before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Administration of Justice of the Comm.
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1983)
(testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings: Jack Valenti].
77. House Hearings: Frank Barnako, supra note 75, at 743.
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ers were engaged in the business of renting tapes. Seventy-five per78
cent of the video retailer's revenue came from tape rentals.
Rentals generate income of up to one hundred dollars per tape, for
79
which the copyright owner receives no royalty.
To recoup lost royalty revenues, the motion picture studios devised two separate plans. First, the studios placed restrictive legends on the cardboard boxes containing the prerecorded movies.
Although the exact language of the legends varies, all legends restrict the use of the tape to private home use. No tape may be cop80
ied or used for purposes other than in the home.
Second, the studios devised a "rental only" program. Walt Disney Studio was the first studio to adopt such a program.8 ' Under
their "rent only" program, Disney had a dual distribution system.
Tapes marked "for sale only" were sold to the retailer to sell directly to consumers. Disney then required retailers to contract for
the "rental only" tapes. Separate books were kept for each type of
82
tape, and royalty fees were collected based upon tape rentals.
Twentieth Century Fox, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, and Warner
Brothers followed suit with "rental only" programs for their new
78. Hearings on S. 1758 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1068 (1982) (testimony of Richard Soukup, Owner, Video Station Stores, Madison, Wisconsin) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Richard
Soukup].
79. See supra note 75. Frank Barnako creates a different picture of the
video retailer's world. Using the $89 retail sales price of "Star Wars" as an example, Barnako observed that the tape must rent 18 times at $5 per night before
the initial investment is recovered. Barnako rents tapes for a 3-day period, so
the time to recover his investment would be 54 days. Because there is usually a
day and a half lag before a film rents again, the time to recover the initial investment is 81 days.
Barnako stressed that popularity of a film lags after the first five weeks,
and the rental demand for the film decreases. As an example, old classics, such
as "Citizen Kane" may be purchased at a cost of $45. But because the film is
older, it may rent only once a month. Thus, it would take a full year before the
initial investment was recovered. Barnako stressed that his break even point
depends upon the purchase price of the tape. House Hearings: Frank Barnako,
supra note 75, at 732.
80. For example, Warner Brothers uses the following legend on its videotapes: "The motion picture contained in this videocassette is protected under
the copyright laws of the United States and other countries and the cassette is
sold for home use only. Duplication, public exhibition, rental or any other commercial use, in whole or in part, is strictly prohibited." The Paramount Pictures
legend states: "Licensed only for noncommercial private exhibition in homes.
Any public performance, or other use, or copying, is strictly prohibited ..
"
81. Disney instituted their "rental only" plan in October of 1981. Hearings
on Home Recording of Copyrighted Works before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Libertiesand Administrationof Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciaryof
the House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 906 (1983) (testimony of
James P. Jimirro, President, Walt Disney Telecommunications Non-Theatrical
Co.) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings:James Jimirro].
82. Comment, Cheaper by the Dozen: Unauthorized Rental of Motion Picture Videocassettes and Videodiscs, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 259, 268 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Cheaper by the Dozen].
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releases.8 3 These programs theoretically enabled the studios to
84
monitor rentals and obtain adequate royalty fees.
Legal Consequences
Both programs, however, proved legally unworkable. First, the
restrictive legends on the tape boxes present a situation analogous
to the Bobbs-Merrill case.8 5 Limitations on a purchaser's use of a
legally copyrighted work are comparable to the resale price provisions imposed on retailers in Bobbs-Merrill. There the Supreme
Court held that the Copyright Act gave the copyright owner no
power to enforce contract provisions against future purchasers who
lacked privity of contract. Additionally, the comments accompanying the Act clearly state that an outright sale frees a copyrighted
work from a copyright owner's control over the resale price or
"other conditions of its future disposition. '8 6 The legends' restriction against rentals also infringes upon the purchaser's future disposition. Thus, the legends were held unenforceable as a matter of
copyright law.
State law remedies, however, are available to the copyright
owner if the purchaser violates a valid contractual provision.87 To
have a valid contract, there must be a meeting of the minds on all
essential terms.8 8 Thus, the movie studios must prove that the re83. Testimony of John Power, supra note 4, at 1071. Rent only limitations
of four and six months, respectively, were imposed on new films released by
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer and Twentieth Century Fox. Warner Brothers imposed
permanent rent only provisions on its new releases. Testimony of Elmer
Cooper,supra note 7, at 695. As of April 12, 1982, the films involved in the rent
only programs were as follows:
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX: History of the World Part I, The Great
Muppet Caper, Dr. No, Eyewitness, Blackie, For Your Eyes Only, Rocky,
Final Conflict, Tatoo, Thunderbolt and Lightfoot, La Cage Aux Folles II,
Eye of the Needle, From Russia With Love, Death Hunt, Zorro: The Gay
Blade, What's New Pussycat?
MGM/CBS: Tarzan the Apeman, S.O.B., Rich and Famous, All the
Marbles.
WARNER BROTHER: Outland, Superman II, Body Heat, Arthur, Excalibur, Prince of the City, Blow Out, Wolfen, Private Benjamin, Altered
States, The Shining.
Id. at 699.
84. All the studios except Disney had abandoned their rental only plans by
1984. Bookkeeping requirements and excessive costs of policing the program
made it impractical. Takiff, Next Battle Zone in the VCR War May Be Neighborhood Rental Outlet, Chicago Tribune, February 9, 1984, at 12, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Takif]].
85. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
86. House Report, supra note 8, at 79.
87. The comments to the Act state that the first sale doctrine "does not
mean that conditions on future dispositions, . . . imposed by contract between
the buyer and seller would be unenforceable between the parties as a breach of
contract." Id.
88. 17 AM. JUR. 2d, Contracts § 18, at 354 (1964).
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tailer had knowledge of the restrictive legend and that the retailer
89
agreed to be bound by its terms.
Enforcement of the restrictive legend would be both impractical and costly. First, the studios would have to prove the retailer
had knowledge of the terms. Even if this were possible, because the
legend is printed clearly on the box, the studios would have to prove
the retailer assented to the provision. 90 A retailer, however, would
unlikely agree to a restricted use. Like the bookdealer in BobbsMerrill, the retailer merely purchases the tapes in the normal
course of business. 91 The terms of the legend are not negotiated.
Thus, to bring breach of contract actions against each video retailer
for violating the terms of the legend would be extremely time consuming, costly, and practically impossible to prove.
The "rental only" schemes attempted to circumvent the evidentiary problems of proving the retailer's assent to the restrictive
legends. Disney contracted with its purchasers for the use of its
films. Due to the nature of the distribution system, these programs
also failed. 92 Retailers rarely purchase directly from the motion
picture studio's distribution company. Wholesale companies serve
93
as middlemen between the studio distributor and the retailer.
The wholesaler would agree to be bound by the "rental only" system, only to then make a sale of the tape to the retailer. As a result,
the retailer purchased the tape without consenting to the contractual restrictions.
Copyright cases suggest that privity of contract is essential to a
successful suit for breach of contract. 94 In the situation described
above, privity is lacking between the retailer and the motion picture
89. M. NIMMER, supra note 50, at § 8.12[B[1]], at 8-122.
90. Id.
91. See supra note 68 at 341.
92. Disney acknowledged itself that the chain of title in videotape distribution made the rent only plan difficult to enforce. House Hearings: James
Jimirro,supra note 81, at 921.
93. Testimony of John Power, supra note 4, at 1070. An example of such
wholesalers or distributors is Communitronics in Chicago, Illinois. Founded in
1976, the company earned over $120 million in 1982. Sales of over $160 million
are predicted in 1983. It should be noted that the company offers a full line of
consumer electronics in addition to its sales of prerecorded videotapes. VS Interview with Jack Silverman, VIDEO STORE, January 1984, at 62-63 [hereinafter
cited as Silverman Interview].
94. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 350-51 (1908) (wholesale dealers did not agree to restrictive legend and were not required to demand consent
from third parties before selling books because there was no privity of contract); Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 517-18 (3d Cir. 1961) (a
valid contract between two persons does not bar a subsequent purchaser from
using the work free of the restriction); Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow
Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (defendant, although aware of
contractual restrictions between plaintiff and his supplier, was not bound by the
contract to which he was not a party).
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95
Studistributor. Only the wholesaler is bound by the restriction.

dios could sue wholesalers for violations of the contract terms, but
this would not be productive. The purpose of the restrictions is to
obtain royalty fees on rentals, not breach of contract damages from
wholesalers. Additionally, lawsuits to enforce the right would be
costly.
Even if the retailer were contractually bound to the "rental
only" system, the system was unsuccessful. Retailers balked at the
bookkeeping requirements, and records were poorly kept, thereby
reflecting inaccurate information. Furthermore, retailers sold the
"sale only" tapes to customers who eventually rented the tapes. 96
These remote purchasers lacked privity with the movie studios.
Unable to enforce their copyrights because of the first sale doctrine,
the studios turned to the newly drafted "public performance" section of the Copyright Act of 1976.
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND CASE LAW

The landmark case construing the public performance exception under the Copyright Act of 1909 was Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
Wyatt.97 In Wyatt, a private yacht club gave an unlicensed exhibi-

tion of a copyrighted film to its members. The court held that the
performance was not "public" because only club members, not the
general public, were admitted.98 Wyatt, however, was expressly
overruled by the first section of the public performance definition
of the Copyright Act of 1976. 99 This section states that a public
place includes any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of the normal circle of family and their social acquaintances
95. See generally Beard, supra note 59, at 465-72 (discussion of the cases
requiring privity of contract to enforce restrictions); Cheaper by the Dozen,
supra note 82, at 276-78 (discussion of privity analysis in video rental distribution chain).
96. Hearings and Home Recording of Copyrighted Works before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Administration of Justice of the Comm.
on the Judiciaryof the House of Representatives,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 905 (1983)
(testimony of Ron Berger, President, National Video, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings: Ron Berger].
97. 21 C.O. BULL. 203 (D. Md. 1932).
98. Id.
99. House Report, supra note 8, at 64. The previous definition of a "public
performance" stated that a copyright owner shall have the exclusive right to:
perform or present the copyrighted work publicly if it be a drama or, if it be
a dramatic work and not reproduced in copies for sale, to vend any manuscript or any record whatsoever thereof; to make or to procure the making
of any transcription or record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part,
it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced, or reproduced, and to exhibit, perform, represent, produce or reproduce it in any manner or by any method whatsoever. ...
17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1976).
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are gathered.1 00 The drafters of the comments observe that this
definition of "public" specifically includes semi-public gatherings.
Places such as lodges, clubs, factories and schools are "public" as
defined by the Act. 1 1
Unfortunately, congressional intent with regard to the second
section of the public performance definition is not as clear. The
second clause states that a communication is public if the public receives the transmission "in the same place or in separate places and
at the same time or at different times."'10

2

No additional commen-

tary adds insight into these phrases. Professor Melville B. Nimmer
suggests that the language refers to repeated performances of the
10 3
same copy to different members of the public at different times.
Two examples are offered by Nimmer. First, he presents the situation of a penny arcade "peep-show" where only one member of the
public can view the motion picture at any given time. Yet, the performance is public because it is repeatedly offered to the public on a
daily basis. 0 4 Second, Nimmer creates a scenario of theatres with
individual screening rooms for greater privacy and viewing schedule flexibility for patrons. He suggests that these private screenings
would also constitute a public performance under the new Act. 10 5
A district court in Columbia Pictures Industries v. Redd
Home 0 6 agreed with Nimmer's conclusion regarding the screening
room scenario. Redd Horne owned two retail video stores offering
83 private screening rooms to the public. The rooms were rented by
two to four people who were either relatives or close social acquaintances. Patrons selected prerecorded videotaped films to rent,
and went to their private screening rooms to watch. 10 7 Seven motion picture studios challenged the practice as an unlicensed public
performance in violation of section 106(4).108 The issue, however, of
whether the practice of renting the copyrighted videotapes constituted an infringement was not raised. 10 9 The court held that the
defendant had caused a public performance by showing the tapes to
100. See supra text accompanying note 40-41.

101. House Report, supra note 8, at 64.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1976).
103. M. NIMMER, supra note 50, at § 8.14[C][3], 8-142-43.
104. Id., at 8-142.1.
105. Id.
106. 568 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
107. Id. at 496, 500.
108. The other motion picture studios involved in the suit were Embassy Pictures, Paramount Pictures, Corp., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., Universal City Studios, Inc., Walt Disney Productions & Warner Brothers, Inc. Id. at
494.

109. Id. at 496 n.3. The court addressed the sole issue of whether Red Horne
had caused a public performance of the videotapes as defined in section 106(4).
Id.
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patrons in the private screening rooms. 110 Rejecting the defendant's argument that it met the terms of the Act because screening
rooms were rented only to family members or close social acquaintances, the court found that the defendant's operation was indistinguishable from the practices of regular movie theatres. Both
facilities were available to paying customers, had limited seating capacities, and were open to the public. Although no more than four
persons could see a tape at any one time, the court found that substantial numbers of the public could view the tapes over time. The
court thus found defendant had infringed on plaintiff's copyrights
by causing an unlicensed public performance."1
The crucial question not raised in Redd Home is whether
rental of the copyrighted tapes for home viewing constitutes a public performance within the meaning of section 106(4). Professor
Nimmer suggests that each rental of a tape constitutes a public performance of the copyrighted movie. 112 Unlike a direct purchaser of
a prerecorded tape or record album who employs the article solely
for home use, the video store owner rents the same copy to the public at different times.113 Professor Nimmer would, thus, find the
video store retailer liable for infringement. 1 1 4 The movie studios
also read the Act as including within the definition of a public per1 15
formance successive rentals of a single tape.
This is not an unfair reading of the new Act. However, one
problem with this reading is that the public performance section
116
was drafted in 1976 to reflect concerns with the cable industry.
Congress expressed no intent that the public performance section
preclude rental of pre-recorded videotapes because the video industry and rental practice did not exist in 1976. Legislative reform,
rather than judicial interpretation, 1 7 should arguably delineate the
scope of the public performance definition as it relates to videotape
rentals.
110. Id. at 500.
111. Id.
112. M. NIMMER, supra note 50, at § 8.14[C][3], 8-143-44.
113. Professor Nimmer carefully distinguishes the sale of a mass produced
copyrighted good for home use by a single purchaser and the case where a single copy is purchased to rent to other consumers. According to Professor Nimmer, the language of section 101 does not limit a single consumer's ability to
purchase a work for performance in his own home. Purchase of record albums
for home playing was the example given of a type of activity the new definition
is not meant to include. Id. at 8-141.
114. Id. at 8-143-44.
115. House Hearings: Jack Valenti, supra note 76.
116. House Report, supra note 8, at 64-65.
117. The Legislature has the resources to analyze the video tape rental market and make broad based policy decisions regarding the industry's growth and
regulation. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 783.
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PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT

Both sides of the video rental controversy have shifted the major battlefront from the courtroom to the halls of Congress. A proposed amendment to the first sale doctrine is now pending before
Congress. 118 The bill, which would add language to section 109(2),
prohibits the rental, lease, or lending of a copy of a copyrighted
work for commercial gain without the copyright owner's consent. 119
Sponsored by Senator Charles C. Mathias, the amendment has received the backing of the Reagan administration 20 and the Registrar of Copyrights. 12 ' Video store owners contend that the
amendment will result in higher rental fees for consumers, higher
122
studio profits, and the death of many retail operations.
118. The issue of amending the Copyright Act to impose royalty fees on the
sales of videorecorders and blank videotapes is not addressed in this paper. See
S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1030, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
119. The bill states in pertinent part:
That, unless authorized by the copyright owner, the owner of a particular
copy of a motion picture or other audiovisual work may not, for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage, dispose of the possession
of that copy by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other activity or practice
in the nature of rental, lease, or lending.
S. 33, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1029, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Identical bills were introduced in the 97th Congress. See S. 1333, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1982); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982).
120. White House Backs Repeal, VIDEO STORE, January 1984, at 8. While the
White House may support repeal of the first sale doctrine, the move is opposed
by consumers. Senator Mathias scheduled hearings on the first sale bill on February 22, 1984. Due to intensive consumer lobbying, including a phone-in and
write-in campaign, enough Senators were persuaded that voting for the measure would be unwise in an election year. Senators failed to attend the meeting,
and without a quorum, no vote could be held. Dunlavey and Gomberg, The
Betamax Decision-Will Congress Erase It?, 2 THE ENTERTAINMENT AND
SPORTS LAWYER 1, 22 (1984) (publication of the ABA Forum Committee on the
Entertainment and Sports Industries).
Hearings were held in the House on October 6, 1983, October 27, 1983, December 13, 1983, and February 23, 1984. More hearings are expected in the near
future. Id.
121. Hearings on Oversight of the Copyright Office and Copyright Royalty
Tribunal before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the
Comm. of the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 65
(1983) (testimony of David Ladd, Registrar of Copyrights).
122. Frank Barnako testified that repeal of the first sale doctrine could increase rental prices by 50 percent and drive 90 percent of the video retailers out
of business. House Hearings: Frank Barnako, supra note 75, at 733. Another
industry official predicts that 50 percent of the video retailers would be driven
out of business. See Silverman Interview, supra note 93, at 71.
Tape rental prices now range from $1 to $2 per day to a high figure of $4 to
$5 per day. Testimony of John Power, supra note 4, at 1071. Mr. Roberts testified that if any amendments to the Act were passed, the rental rates for prerecorded videotapes should still average about $5 per day. Testimony of
Stephen Roberts, supra note 3, at 315. Video retailers, however, dispute Roberts'
predictions. Both Jack Wayman, of the Electronic Industry Association, and
Joan Chase, of the Video Software Dealer's Association, predict increases in
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On the other hand, the amendment proposed by the studios
calls for clarification of the public performance definition in section
101.123 The amendment provides that a public performance can occur in a private home if: (a) the cumulative total of persons capable
of viewing the particular copy is greater than the circle of family
and close friends and (b) the particular copy was furnished to obtain a direct or indirect commercial gain. 1 24 Because congressional
debates have not been held on this bill, the practical and legal
125
ramifications have yet to be fully explored.
rental prices to $8 to $10 per night. Jacobs, Are Movie Rentals Going Up in
Smoke?, VIDEO REV., May 1984, at 20, 21.
Furthermore, opponents of the first sale repeal suggest that the less popular titles will not be available. Studios could take less popular, less profitable
titles off the market to encourage sales of the newer, more popular titles. This
means a reduced movie selection for the consumer. Id. at 21-22.
Finally, it is unclear whether the first sale repeal would be retroactive.
The White House supports a non-retroactive application of the measure. Id. at
22. Peter Nolan, Senior Counsel for Disney Home Video, believes that the current version of the bill would apply retroactively to all tapes currently on the
market. Id. at 114.
123. Testimony of Stephen Roberts, supra note 3, at 323. The full text of the
amendment states:
The reference to 'at different times' in the preceding sentence refers to
those circumstances in which one particular copy or phonorecord of a work
is employed to communicate two or more performances or displays of such
work (whether such performances or displays occur in private homes or
otherwise), provided: (1) the total number of persons cumulatively capable
of receiving all such performances or displays collectively constitute a substantial number of persons outside the normal circle of one family and its
social acquaintances, and (2) such particular copy or phonorecord was furnished or otherwise made available to communicate such performance or
displays in order to derive a direct or indirect commercial advantage.
Id.
124. Stephen Roberts submitted the following rationale for the bill:
When the same copy of a given work gives rise to numerous performances
by different members of the public, each such performance (although it is
not received by the public generally) must be regarded as a public performance because the public at large receives performances 'at different times'
all emanating from the same copy.
Id. at 322.
125. While Congress has not debated the bill, scholars have commented on
the proposed public performance amendment. One commentator views the bill
as a practical way to insure that copyright owners are fully compensated for
performances of their works. Cheaper by the Dozen, supra note 82, at 286. Another commentator observes that the amendment raises privacy issues if
homeviewing is the act that triggers the public performance, and hence, infringement liability. Lewson, supra note 65, at 30. Stephen Roberts suggests
that the video retailer is liable for infringement because he furnished the means
for executing the public performance, and that the individual home viewer
would not be prosecuted for infringement. Testimony of Stephen Roberts,
supra note 3, at 323.
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ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY

While Congress is considering amendments to the Act, an analysis of the alternatives and their impact is appropriate. First, judicial resolution of the issue is not likely to occur, and a resolution of
the issue on a case-by-case basis is impractical. Video presents an
emerging technology that is not specifically addressed by the Copyright Act of 1976. Explicit statutory language regarding video, and
12 6
clear statements of congressional intent cannot be found.

Although courts have power to make case-by-case determinations
of video related issues, they lack the resources to fully assess the

new market and develop a cogent policy for future practice. Thus,
nonjudicial solutions should be devised. Statutory clarification and
market forces offer two viable solutions to the videotape rental
question.
Analysis of the Proposed Amendments

The proposed amendments to sections 109(a) and 106(4) both
present viable alternatives for clarification of the Act and resolution of the unanswered questions surrounding the propriety of renting prerecorded tapes. Under the proposed amendment to section
109(a), copyright owners would obtain a limited exception to the
first sale doctrine. 1 2 7 The need to prove absence of a first sale because of a license or a contract would not be necessary. Once a
copyright owner proves unauthorized renting for commercial gain,
the Act would establish liability. The copyright owner could then

seek damages for infringement or license fees to secure economic
compensation for his copyright.

128

126. Betamax, 104 S. Ct. at 783.
127. While the present first sale amendment does not address the question of
renting records for profit, audio rental is addressed in two other bills pending
before Congress. See S. 32, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1027, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983). The audio rental bill passed the Senate unanimously in June,
1983. Dunlavey and Gomberg, supra note 120, at 22. Further House hearings
are scheduled on H.R. 1027. Id.
The rent-a-record problem is a growing one. Rent-a-record retail outlets,
unknown in 1982, numbered over 214 in 1983. Phillips and Grahm, New Developments in Recording Contract Negotiations: Reflections of a Changing Economic Profile, 2 ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAWYER 1, 5 (1984) (publication
of the ABA Forum Committee on the Entertainment and Sports Industries). In
Japan over 1,600 rent-a-record outlets exist. Japanese studies show that 94 percent of persons who rent records do so to make copies. Record sales have decreased by 30 percent in areas where a rental and retail record store exist. Id.
CBS estimates that it looses $700 to $800 million each year because of illegal
record copying. Frank, Payment Due, 129 FORBES 124, 126 (1982). As stated by
Eric Hultman, General Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, illegal
copying is so extensive "that pot [marijuana] would be the only other thing to
rival it." Id. See generally Hearingson S. 1768 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 997 (1982).
128. For a discussion of remedies, see infra text accompanying notes 129-38.
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The proposed amendment to the public performance section
would eliminate any questions regarding congressional intent.
Once the copyright owner proves that the retailer made the copy
available to the public to derive a commercial advantage, liability is
established. The copyright owner then can sue for infringement or
29
obtain royalties for each public performance of his work.
Statutory Remedies

Statutory remedies for infringement are included in the Act. If
a motion picture studio established that a video retailer's rental of
tapes constituted infringement under either of the proposed amendments, the studio could seek an injunction, 1 30 actual damages and
lost profits,' 3 ' statutory damages,

32

and costs and attorney's

33

fees.'
Every successful suit could result in a studio collecting actual damages incurred as a result of the video retailer's infringement as well as profits not included in the damage calculations that
the video retailer earned through the infringement. 3 4 Moreover, a
successful suit could result in an injunction restraining the retailer
35
Stufrom future rental of copyrighted prerecorded videotapes.'
dios would, thus, have a legal remedy available to enforce the protections guaranteed to them by the proposed amendments to the
Act.
Liability would be easier to prove under either of the amendments. Litigation, however, would still be an unattractive solution.
The video retail business is growing at phenomenal rates.' 36 The
137
rental problem is already out of control and is multiplying daily.
To enforce their copyrights, studios would be required to file numerous lawsuits, and the prosecution of these suits would prove
time consuming and costly. Even if all attorney's fees were ordered
129. See infra text accompanying notes 129-38.
130. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982).
131. Id. at § 504(b).
132. Id. at § 504(c).
133. Id. at § 505.
134. The act provides that, "the copyright owner is entitled to recover the
actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not
taken into account in computing actual damages." Id. at § 504(b).
135. A permanent injunction generally will be issued once infringement has
been proven and the threat of continuing violation exists. Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y.) (a permanent injunction was proper where continued threat of using pirated copies of plaintiff's
copyrighted films existed); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills,
Inc., 519 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (injunction proper where defendant was
prepared to produce more textiles bearing plaintiff's copyrighted design).
136. See supra text accompanying note 2.
137. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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paid by the defendants, 138 a cash outlay would be tied up in litigation for long periods of time. Studios would have to vigilantly guard
their rights until the threat of lawsuits became so great that compliance with licensing or performing rights fees became voluntary on
the part of video store owners. Given the massive growth in this
retail industry, piecemeal litigation does not present a workable
139
solution.
Direct Studio/Retailer Licensing
Both the public performance and first sale amendments give
the studio a clear right to collect royalties on the performance or
licensing of their tapes. 140 Negotiated performance or licensing fees
avoid the costs of litigation to obtain royalties due from video store
owners. 14 ' A prototype for this exists in the current arrangements
between the feature film distributor and theatre owners. Theatre
owners license the film based on a flat fee or a percentage of the net
receipts on the film. When a run of the film is over, the film is
returned to the distributor for holding or redistribution. 142 A similar system theoretically could be developed between videotape distributors and the retail owner. Two practical problems, however,
make this solution not feasible.
143
First, a middleman exists in the videotape distribution chain.
138. Although the Court's power to award costs and attorney's fees is discretionary, the power is frequently exercised. M. NIMMER, supra note 50, at
§§ 14.09, 14.10.
139. Two commentators who addressed the video rental issue did not even
discuss litigation under the Copyright Act as a means of enforcing royalty
rights. Cheaper by the Dozen, supra note 81; Lewson, supra note 64.
140. Public performance rights and licensing rights are separate rights. The
amendment to section 101 would provide that each rental of a tape is a public
performance which must be authorized by the copyright owner. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(4) (1982). The amendment to the first sale doctrine would, in essence,
give the copyright owner a right to royalties on works he has sold and that are
used to derive commercial gain. See id. at § 109(a). While the rights are separate, the practical problems of collecting public performance royalties and first
sale royalties are identical. Thus, fee collection problems are treated as identical throughout the remainder of this comment.
141. Alan Hirschfield, Chairman of Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, has revealed what the company will do if the bill is passed. Hirschfield
stated that a dual inventory system would be instituted. Wholesale prices
would be reduced by 50 percent, to an average of $29.95 per copy. Rental only
plans would be based upon either a surcharge plan, or a consignment plan for
every tape entered. Takiff, supra note 84.
142. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1982). Fees are set through a competitive bidding process in which exhibitors
submit sealed bids to distributors for review. Even if a bid is rejected an exhibitor still may be able to obtain the film through negotiations. Id. at 488-89. See
generally Note, Motion Picture Split Agreements: An Antitrust Analysis, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 159 (1983) (analyzes split bidding agreements and argues that
such arrangements are per se violations of the antitrust laws).
143. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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The studios would have to trace the tape copy from the distributor,
to the wholesaler, and to the ultimate purchaser who rented the
tape for profit. Unlike the feature film distribution system, licenses
would be negotiated after the tapes were purchased by the retailer. 4 4 Retailers would purchase tapes not knowing the license
fees until negotiations with the studios had concluded. Such a system would reduce all bargaining power of the retail purchaser. As
long as a middleman exists in the distribution chain, direct negotia14 5
tions are unworkable.
Second, studios would be negotiating with thousands of retail
owners. Each of these owners inventories hundreds or thousands of
titles. 146 Unlike the transactions between a finite number of theatre owners for a limited number of feature films, 1 47 policing rental

tape licenses would involve hundreds of thousands of transactions
monthly. The sheer volume of transactions makes studio/retailer
48
licensing agreements impractical.
Performing or Licensing Rights Societies

An alternative to direct licensing and distribution by the studio
could be the formation of a performing rights society to handle the
licensing arrangements on prerecorded videotapes. Prototypes of
these nonprofit organizations already exist. 149 The three major societies are the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP); Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI); and the Society of
European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC). Composers, au144. See supra text accompanying note 140.
145. The middleman problem could be eliminated if the studios entered the
wholesale industry and appointed local agents to negotiate royalty fees when
retailers purchased tapes. Some wholesale companies are already owned by the
motion picture studios. Cheaper by the Dozen, supra note 82, at 227 n.104.
146. It is estimated that an average store catalogues over 500 titles. House
Hearings: Frank Barnako, supra note 75, at 732. Many retailers, however,
pride themselves on carrying a large number of the approximately 15,000 titles
available on prerecorded videotapes. See Commtron Corporation Videotape
Price List, Effective Date 2/01/84. As an example, Video Adventure, located in
Evanston, Illinois, carries over 2,000 Beta and VHS titles. Video Adventure Title List, March 1984, Evanston, Illinois.
147. Films are released in three stages, known as first run, intermediate run,
and wide break. On a first run, the distributor usually licenses the film to a
small number of theatres for an exclusive time period. Southway Theatres, 672
F.2d at 488. This reduces the amount of monthly transactions that are needed
on each film.
148. A direct licensing scheme is quite similar to the rental only plans that
were attempted by the studios, and abandoned by all but Disney. Takiff, su pra
note 84. See supra text accompanying notes 91-92.
149. Although performing rights societies collect royalties due under the
public performance section of the Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982), the pooling arrangement could also be used to collect royalty fees due for renting the copy of
a work for profit without the copyright owner's consent under the proposed
amendment to section 109(a).
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thors, and publishers assign their performing rights to these societies. In turn, the societies collect and distribute the royalties due on
the small performance rights of their members. 150 Licenses generally are granted on a blanket basis,15 ' and royalties are distributed
to members based upon the average number of times the work was
performed. The societies have proved highly successful, and in
1980, they handled the licensing rights of over four million
152
compositions.
Antitrust and the PerformingRights Society
The practice of blanket licensing, however, raises antitrust
questions. First, section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies which restrain trade. 5 3 When
a group has set prices for its goods, the Supreme Court has found
that this conduct is per se'5 4 violative of the Sherman Act. 155 Second, section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits selling goods, on the con150. For a discussion of small performance rights, see Perrone, Small and
Grand PerformingRights? (Who Cared Before "Jesus ChristSuperstar'), 20 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 19 (1972) (analysis of what constitutes a small, or nondramatic, performance of a musical work under the provisions of the Copyright
Act of 1909).
151. Blanket licenses are licenses which give the licensee the right to use any
and all of the music in a society's repetory. The licenses have a set date of
expiration, and fees are usually set either on a percentage of the licensees total
revenue for the year, or a flat amount. The cost does not reflect the type or
amount of music used by the licensee. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 15 (1979).
152. Id. at 46. Unlike BMI and ASCAP, SESAC is privately owned. SESAC
handles the performing rights of only 300 publisher and writer affiliates. Note,
Controlling the Market Power of Performing Rights Societies: An Administrative Substitutefor Antitrust Regulation, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 103, 106 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Market Power].
153. The Sherman Act states in pertinent part that, "every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." '15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
154. Courts analyze antitrust cases under either the per se analysis or rule of
reason analysis. Under per se analysis, the courts decide that some acts are so
detrimental to competition that they can be declared illegal without inquiring
into business motives or justifications. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958). Conversely, courts look to business motives and justifications
under a rule of reason analysis. Because some restraints on trade may be necessary for healthy competition, courts consider the market structure, the effect of
the restraint on competition, and the defendant's intent. Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
For a discussion of the per se analysis and rule of reason analysis, see Phelan, The Continuing Battle with the Performing Rights Societies: The Per Se
Rule, The Rule of Reason Standard, and Copyright Misuse, 15 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 349, 360-74 (1984). See also Comment, Convergence of the Copyright Law
and Sherman Act, 51 Miss. L.J. 79 (1980) (discussion of the Sherman Act as it
pertains to copyright cases).
155. Kiefer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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dition that the purchaser will not deal in the goods of the seller's
competitor, if the effect is to substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. 1 56 These arrangements, called tying arrangements,
157
also have been stricken by the Supreme Court.
The Justice Department realized the potential antitrust
problems and now governs the conduct of the societies through consent decrees.' 58 Antitrust suits are not limited to government
plaintiffs, and numerous private parties have sought refuge in the
antitrust laws. 159 Motion picture theatre owners initiated a class
action suit in Alden-Rochelle v. ASCAP. 160 Plaintiffs objected to
ASCAP's practice of issuing blanket licenses to cover the music per156. Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods ... or
other commodities ...

or fix a price charged therefor ...

on the condition,

agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods ... or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
157. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). The Court discussed tying arrangements in the context of the motion picture industry in
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). Paramount had
engaged in the practice of blockbooking. It required exhibitors to purchase a
package of films containing marketable new features as well as less desired
films. Because the copyright owner of the less desired feature had his copyright
monopoly strengthened through the sale of his works with the popular films,
the Court found the practice constituted an illegal tie-in. Id. at 158.
The illegality of tie-ins was reaffirmed in United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371
U.S. 38 (1962). Motion picture distributors sold feature films to television stations in blocks. Even though a station might only want 10 or 15 films, it had to
purchase the entire block. Block prices varied for $15,000 for a 100 film block to
$314,725 for an entire library of 723 films. Id. at 39-41. The Court held that the
practice was anticompetitive and violative of the antitrust laws. Id. at 49-51.
158. BMI entered into consent decrees with the Justice Department in 1941
and 1966. United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1940-43 Trade Cases para.
56,096 (E.D. Wisc. 1941); United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade
Cases para. 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). ASCAP entered into Justice Department
consent decrees in 1941, 1950, and 1960. United States v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade
Cases para. 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); 1950-51 Trade Cases para. 62,505 (1950); 1960
Trade Cases para. 69,612 (1960). As a result of these consent decrees, ASCAP
and BMI must permit their members to license performing rights independent
of the society. Any licensee who objects to the blanket license fee set by the
society may appeal the reasonableness of the fee to the District Court for the
Southern District of New York. BMI, 441 U.S. at 10-12.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). The Clayton Act provides in pertinent part that
"any person who shall be injured in his business or his property by reason of
anything forbidden by the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained ..
" Id.
160. 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). The class consisted of 164 motion picture exhibitors, who owned over 200 theatres. Id. at 890.
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formance rights of films they exhibited. 1 61 While "per piece"
licenses were available, 16 2 the structure of the market precluded
plaintiffs from using this option. Negotiations for films occurred

63
long before the exhibitor received the list of music in the film.'

Exhibitors thus lacked bargaining power to negotiate a reasonable
fee on a per use basis.
The court in Alden-Rochelle found that ASCAP was a monopoly as defined by the Sherman Act.1 6 4 Because ASCAP restrained
competition among composers, the court held that the licensing
practice was an illegal combination in restraint of trade.1 65 The
court determined that competition between composers would be increased if the motion picture studios obtained public performance
rights from ASCAP members at the same time that synchronization rights were negotiated. 166 As a result, exhibitors received the
cost of the public performance right, competitively negotiated by
the film producer, in the cost of licensing their film from the
16 7
studio.
Despite the holding of Alden-Rochelle, in K-91 v. Gershwin
Publishing Co.,168 the court found that blanket licensing to local
69
radio stations did not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.1
Gershwin sued K-91 for copyright infringement, and K-91 counterclaimed that the plaintiff participated in ASCAP for the purpose of
restraining trade. 1 70 The court found that any antitrust violations
by ASCAP had been "disinfected" by the Justice Department con161. The court observed that the motion picture studios owned several publishing companies that were members of ASCAP. Publishers were allotted 50
percent of ASCAP net proceeds, of which the motion picture studio owned publishers received 37 percent. Id. at 892.
162. The court found that an average film contained 20 pieces of music, of
which ASCAP owned 80 percent. An exhibitor would thus have to negotiate at
least 64 licenses per week. Id. at 893.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 153.
165. Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 895.
166. Synchronization rights are the right to put the music with the film itself, not the right to play the music in a public performance of the film. Id. at
893. When motion picture producers negotiated music rights with non-ASCAP
members, they purchased both the synchronization rights and the public performance licensing rights. The court found that the producer also could
purchase both rights from ASCAP members during negotiations for synchronization rights. Id. Because studio synchronization right negotiations were for
individual compositions, at prices of $100 to $25,000, the court found that this
arrangement increased competition among composers. Id.
167. Id. at 896.
168. 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967).
169. Id. at 4.
170. Id. at 2. Some courts have expressed disfavor with using antitrust defenses to copyright infringement claims and have denied defendants the use of
the antitrust defense. See United Artists Assoc., Inc. v. NWL Corp., 198 F.
Supp. 953, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187
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sent decrees. Moreover, the court emphasized that K-91 could
purchase licenses directly from the copyright holder. Finally, the
court observed that any party dissatisfied with the licensing fees set
by ASCAP could appeal to the District Court for the Southern District of New York for a determination of the reasonableness of the
fee. 171 The court affirmed the trial court's order of one thousand
dollars of damages for the plaintiff and an injunction barring K-91
172
from future infringing conduct.
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of blanket licensing in BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastSystem, Inc.
(BMI).17 3 CBS challenged the blanket license as a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. After reviewing the structure and purpose of
the performing rights societies, the Court held that a rule-of-reason
analysis should apply. 174 The BMI decision relied on four factors.
First, potential licensees could negotiate directly with copyright
owners, or obtain a per program license for musical pieces from
BMI. If licensees were dissatisfied with the blanket license fees,
they could ask the district court to review the fee schedules. 175 Second, the Court observed that the Copyright Act of 1976 itself provides for compulsory blanket licensing of cable television,
F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (dictum). Cf. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American
Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947).
A copyright misuse defense presents a similar problem. The defense doctrine of copyright misuse was established in Witmark & Sons v. Jensen, 80 F.
Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948). The court found that pooling public performance
rights gave members of the society rights beyond the limited monopoly granted
by the Copyright Act. Id. at 846-47. The court stated:
However free plaintiffs and their associates in ASCAP may have been from
any design or intent to extend their copyright monopoly, or however beneficial it may be for them to carry on their business in this manner, or however inconvenient it may be for them to function otherwise, such facts and
circumstances will not permit them to enlarge their lawful monopoly.
Id. at 848. Copyright misuse claims are independent of antitrust claims. Fine,
Misuse and Antitrust Defenses to CopyrightInfringementActions, 17 HASTINGS
L.J. 315 (1965) (misuse doctrine covers all types of conduct which extend copyright monopoly grant); Gibbs, Copyright Misuse: Thirty Years Waiting for the
Other Shoe, 23 CORP. L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 31 (1977) (courts should not confuse
the antitrust laws with the defense doctrine of copyright misuse).
171. Gershwin, 372 F.2d at 3-4.
172. Id. at 2.
173. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).

174. The majority never addressed the question of whether blanket licensing
constituted an illegal tying arrangement and CBS chose not to appeal that finding because the district court found that BMI was not liable under that count.
Id. at 6-7. Justice Stevens' dissent, however, applied the tying arrangement
analysis to the blanket licensing practice, which he characterized as
"blockbooking." Id. at 28 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although an individual
license was available to users, Justice Stevens found that blanket licensing
caused price discrimination and significant barriers to entry into the performing
rights society market. Id. at 37. Thus, he found the blanket license constituted
an illegal tying arrangement. Id. at 38. See supra note 157.
175. BMI, 441 U.S. at 11-12.
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broadcasters, juke box owners, and record distributors. 176 Third,
the Court addressed the realities of the market. Not only would
thousands of copyright owners have trouble policing the public performances of their works, but the transactional costs of negotiating
separate licenses would be extremely high. 177 Finally, the Court
observed that competition among composers was not reduced because the blanket license was, in essence, a different good than that
offered by a single composer. The Court observed that consumers
preferred the blanket license over the individually negotiated license. 178 The Court remanded the case to the district court with
orders to consider the above factors in rendering an opinion under
the rule-of-reason analysis.
BMI, however, did not stop the flow of private suits. A small
bar owner challenged the blanket licensing arrangement in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc.179 BMI sued Moor-Law for infringement, and Moor-Law counterclaimed that the blanket license
constituted an illegal tying arrangement and price fixing under the
Sherman Act.' 8 0 Using the rule-of-reason analysis prescribed by
the Supreme Court in BMI, the district8 court found that the practice did not violate the antitrust laws.' '
The court in Moor-Law adopted a rationale quite similar to that
in BMI. Observing that numerous copyright owners and entertainment establishments existed in the market, the court found that
licensing directly from the copyright owner would be costly. The
performing rights societies reduced transactional costs and facilitated quick and efficient licensing. The court distinguished BMI by
observing that, unlike other large industries which had some market power as buyers, the small entertainment establishments
lacked bargaining power in the marketplace182
The court determined, however, that blanket licensing consti176. Id. at 15-16. For a discussion of compulsory licensing see infra text accompanying notes 217-31.
177. The Court observed that "[i]ndividual sales transactions in this industry
are quite expensive, as would be individual monitoring and enforcement, especially in light of the resources of single composers." BMI, 441 U.S. at 20. See
Market Power, supra note 152, at 107-11 (discussing the transactional costs of
identification, information, time and enforcement).
178. The Court noted that CBS had never attempted to obtain anything but a
blanket license. BMI, 441 U.S. at 5-6. On remand, the Second Circuit applied
the rule of reason analysis and found that blanket licenses were not anticompetitive, and because they were a result of consumer preference, they did not violate the Sherman Act. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of
Composers, 620 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1980).
179. 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981).
180. Id. at 759.
181. Id. at 765, 775.
182. Id. at 762-64.
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tuted an illegal tying arrangement. 183 The court then applied a
rule-of-reason analysis to determine whether alternative pricing
structures would reduce some of the anti-competitive effects of the
tying arrangement. 8 4 Moor-Law proposed a mini-license by music
category, which the court rejected because of classification
problems.' 8 5 A per use system based upon random sampling was
rejected because of increased transaction costs. 1 86 Finally, the court

declined to use its authority to oversee the fees charged by BMI
because the constant oversight would require them to function as a
regulatory agency. 187 As a result, the court found blanket licensing
of entertainment establishments did not violate the antitrust
laws.188

The rule-of-reason analysis yielded a different result in Buffalo
Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP.'8 9 Local television stations initiated a
class action suit challenging the blanket license issued by
ASCAP. 190 The court analyzed the market and found that syndicated television programming' 9 ' comprised sixty-five to seventyfive percent of all local television programming. Locally-produced
programs comprised the remaining programming. 92 Local stations
purchased blanket licenses primarily to cover music rights for the
1 93
syndicated programs.
183. Id. at 765-66. The court analogized BMI's blanket licensing practices to
the blockbooking arrangements previously condemned by the Supreme Court.
See supra note 158.
184. The court listed the anticompetitive effects as increasing the copyright
monopoly power of the artist holding the copyright to the inferior good, higher
prices to the purchaser, and barriers to entry for potential BMI competitors.
Moor-Law, 527 F. Supp. at 766.
185. Id. at 767. Moor-Law proposed licensing by categories such as country
western, bluegrass, folk, and other musical genre. Id. at 767. An expert testified that while categorization based upon song score and lyrics would be difficult, there was no way to control the style in which the performer chose to sing
the work. Id. at 768.
186. Id. at 769. The court also found that the random sampling system would
not materially affect the market constraints existing under the blanket licensing system. BMI would still have the power to set a per use random sampling
price base. Id. at 770.
187. Id. at 772. The court quoted from an opinion by Judge Kaufman and
noted that "[j]udicial oversight of pricing policies would place the courts in a
role akin to that of a public regulatory commission. We would be wise to decline that function unless Congress clearly bestows it upon us." Id. at 772
(quoted in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir.
1979)).
188. BMI, 527 F. Supp. at 775.
189. 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
190. Id. at 276.
191. Syndicated television programs are motion pictures and prerecorded
and live television programs that local stations may purchase or license for nonnetwork broadcast. Id. at 279.
192. Id.
193. The court observed that music in television programs was either feature
music, where the focus was on the song itself, theme music which opened pro-
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The court followed an analysis similar to that used by the court
in Alden-Rochelle. 94 Once again, composers gave television producers only synchronization rights to the music, and then demanded
public performance royalties from stations when the programs
were aired. 195 The court observed that negotiations between the
producer and composer for synchronization rights were price competitive, while local stations were forced to accept blanket licenses
196
for music performance rights.
The court in Buffalo Broadcastingfound that source licensing
of music performance rights for syndicated programming presented
a workable solution. 197 Direct licensing for locally-produced programs was found to be more competitive and cost effective than
blanket licensing. 198 The court enjoined BMI from issuing blanket
199
licenses to local television stations.
Formation of a PerformingRights or Licensing Right's Society
for Owners of Copyrighted Videotapes
Theoretically, owners of copyrighted films embodied on videotape could band together to form a performing rights society or licensing rights society. 200 Copyrights to a film are typically owned
grams, or background music within the program itself. Id. at 281. Local stations could control the amount and type of music they used in their own
productions, but they had to accept the music within the syndicated programs if
they wanted to broadcast the syndicated shows. Id.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 160-67.
195. Buffalo Broadcasting,546 F. Supp. at 281-84.
196. Id. at 284. The court found that local stations had no bargaining power
and could not negotiate favorable licensing fees with BMI because the bidding
for the syndicated programming itself was highly competitive. Id. at 280. Eight
companies controlled licensing of the syndicated programming desired by 750
local stations. Id. at 279-80. Thus, the local stations were forced to accept the
responsibility of obtaining music performance rights if they wanted the syndicated programs. Id. at 289.
197. Because the producers had the power to set prices at the time synchronization rights were obtained. Id. at 284. The court found that source licensing
of syndicated television program music performance rights would increase competition among composers. Id. at 292.
198. Local stations could choose pieces of music they wished to place in their
own productions. Id. at 291. They were free to deal with owners of preexisting
pieces of copyrighted music or hire a local composer to create music that they
needed. Id. These transactional costs would be significantly less than negotiating for vast numbers of licenses in the syndicated programs. Id. at 294.
199. Id. at 296.
200. This next section assumes that all copyright owners of motion pictures
assign their performances or licensing rights to a society for enforcement. The
analysis would be the same, however, if each motion picture studio decided to
license their films on a blanket basis. While price-fixing would not be an issue
because there would be no "combination," blanket licenses from one studio
would still theoretically constitute a tying arrangement.
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by the producer of the film or the motion picture studio. 20 1 Such a
group is more concentrated and powerful than the myriad of small
composers, authors, and publishers which comprise the bulk of BMI
and ASCAP membership.2 02 While the members may be more
powerful, the policing problems still exist. Video retail operations
are proliferating, and monitoring each film rental presents a herculean task. 20 3 Individual negotiations would have exceedingly high
transactional costs.

20 4

These market conditions are what initially

20
prompted the formation of BMI and ASCAP.

5

The question becomes whether blanket licensing of prerecorded videotapes to retailers would violate the antitrust laws.
The rationales in Alden-Rochelle and Buffalo Broadcasting do not
apply to film performance and licensing rights. Film performance
and licensing rights are not obtained by the producer in the course
of production. 20 6 Performance and licensing rights to a film are
held by the studio itself, and not by a third party. 20 7 Thus, the concept of encouraging "source licensing" is inapplicable to the video208
tape rental controversy. The source itself owns the copyright.
In contrast, the rationale of BMI and Moor-Law readily adapts
to an analysis of the videotape rental controversy. As in BMI, the
video store retailer could directly negotiate fees for licensing or performance rights with the copyright owner. The cost of negotiations
on each film would be prohibitive, just as the cost of individual
201. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 568 F. Supp. at 494-95
(W.D. Pa. 1983).
202. ASCAP has approximately 21,000 writer and 8,000 publisher members.
BMI has 38,000 writer and 22,000 publisher members. Buffalo Broadcasting Co.,
Inc. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 546 F. Supp. 274,
277 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In contrast, the primary videotape distributors are MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Columbia Pictures, Twentieth Century Fox, Paramount Pictures, Walt Disney Studios, Embassy Studios, Warner Brothers, and Universal
City Studios. Commtron Corporation Video Tape Price List, effective 2/01/84.
203. Takiff, supra note 85.
204. See supra notes 15 and 16.
205. BMI, 441 U.S. at 4-5. Even a private synchronization rights broker, The
Harry Fox Agency, functions similarly to BMI and ASCAP. The agency serves
as the agent for approximately 3,500 publishers. Persons wishing to use a published piece of music contact the Harry Fox Agency, which sets a price for use
of the piece. While negotiations and prices are set on a per piece basis, pooling
of all the copyrights with a single agent reduces the costs of locating the copyright owner before negotiations begin. See Buffalo Broadcasting,546 F. Supp.
at 284; Alden-Rochelle, 80 F. Supp. at 893. See generally Market Power, supra
note 152, at 122 (argues that Harry Fox negotiations are not competitive and
closely resemble blanket licenses).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 158-67, 190-99.
207. In fact, the Alden-Rochelle holding that synchronization rights and performance rights can not be split obviates the need for the video retailer to obtain music performance rights when renting his tapes. See supra text
accompanying notes 157-66.
208. Buffalo Broadcasting,546 F. Supp. at 284.
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20 9
transactions made per program licensing impractical in BMI.
Moreover, the pricing alternative rejected by the Moor-Law court
should also be rejected in the present case. 210 The category blanket
license is impractical because a single film can be categorized in several genre. 2 11 Keeping books to assess a per-use price based on random sampling would simply add additional costs to rental
transactions, which would probably be passed on to the consumer.212 Finally, seeking court intervention to review fees is a
long, costly process, which judges and plaintiffs have been reluctant
213
to use as a remedy.

A performing rights society to monitor videotape rentals and
grant licenses to retailers would thus withstand antitrust challenges
under the precedent of BMI and Moor-Law.214 Although price competition would be reduced because retail owners would not be bidding on individual films, the transaction costs of a per use system
would be prohibitive. 215 The society would have power to fix prices,
and probably would come under Justice Department scrutiny, and
eventually, would be limited by a consent decree to prevent potential abuses of monopoly power.2 16 Given the parallels between the
video market and those in BMI and Moor-Law, and the lack of feasible alternatives to a blanket licensing scheme, the society could
present a practical, cost effective way to compensate copyright owners for licensing and public performance rights for their works embodied on videotape.
Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licensing could also secure a copyright owner's
right to royalties due on videotape rentals. 217 While specific language would have to be added to either the first sale or public per209. See supra text accompanying note 178.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 184-88.
211. Typical categories of films include comedy, drama, horror, action/adventure, foreign, musicals and children's films. "All That Jazz" featured
song and dance, but had a serious dramatic theme. "My Dinner With Andre"
contained serious food for thought interspersed with some hilarious moments.
While many consider "The Paper Chase" a drama, most law students or lawyers
can find a good deal of humor in the film.
212. See supra text accompanying note 187.
213. See Market Power, supra note 152, at 121-24 (analysis of litigation costs
and the limits of the District Court for the Southern District of New York's
power to review licensing fees).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 152-99.
215. Id.
216. See supra note 158.
217. Compulsory licensing, with collection of royalties by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, was established by the Copyright Act of 1976. See generally Brylawski, The Copyright Royalty Tibunal, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1265 (1977)
(discussion of the organization and operations of the Copyright Tribunal and its
compulsory licensing functions).
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formance amendments to include tape rentals in this scheme, the
remedy is feasible. As with cable transmissions, record sales, jukebox performances, and broadcasts, the Register of Copyrights
would establish royalty fees for public performance or licensing
rights of videotapes. 2 18 Video retailers would have to file an application of intent to use the copyrighted work with the Copyright Office. 219 A fee, probably monthly, would be assessed against rental
vendors. 220 Fees could be based on playing time of the tape multiplied by the number of rentals, a flat fee for each rental, a monthly
flat fee for use of all prerecorded tapes, or by some other measuring
device. 2 21 A vendor's failure to comply with the compulsory licensing would render him liable for an infringement suit under section
501.222

An alternative compulsory licensing scheme regulates the royalties due from broadcasters to copyright owners of nondramatic
musical works, and published pictorial, graphic and sculptural
works.223 Section 118(b) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any provision of the antitrust laws," broadcasters may negotiate separately
for nondramatic music rights and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
display rights. 22 4 A common agent may be appointed to collect and
distribute royalty fees. 2 25 These voluntary agreements will supersede any rates set by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal if the rates are
filed with the Tribunal within thirty days of execution. 226 Thus,
section 118 presupposes the formation of a licensing rights society to
handle the negotiations on behalf of the copyright owners. 227 Given
the apparent antitrust immunity, these organizations would not
face the antitrust problems encountered by BMI, ASCAP, or an independently formed organization to secure licenses for royalties
218. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 116 (1982). The Copyright Royalty Tribunal also
has the ability to set rates for the broadcast industry if the individuals do not
choose to negotiate a separate agreement. Id. § 118(b).
219. For example, section 115 governs licenses for making and distributing
phonorecords. A record distributor must apply for the license prior to the distribution of any records. The filing of an application provides notice to the
copyright owners and precludes infringement suits. Id. § 115(b).
220. Monthly fees are assessed against record distributors. Id. § 115(C)(3).
Jukebox royalties are paid annually. Id. § 116(B)(1)(a). Cable royalties are collected and accountings rendered semiannually, id. § 111(d)(2), with annual distribution of funds. Id. § 111(d)(5).
221. Record distribution royalties are now collected on each record sold. The
fee is based upon the larger of two and three-fourths cents, or one-half of one
cent per minute of playing time. Id. § 115(C)(2).
222. See id. § 115(4) (failure to comply with licensing requirements renders
record distributor liable for infringement).
223. Id. § 118(b).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. § 118(b)(2).
227. Brylawski, supra note 217, at 1275. No similar society for pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural artists has yet been formed. Id. at n.60.
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228
due on tape rentals.
Such a system, however, again places the bargaining power in
the hands of the performing rights societies. 229 Thus, compulsory
licensing with fees set by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal is the
most desirable course. First, a federal agency will be setting fees,
rather than a private performing rights society. Second, the Registrar of Copyrights can hold hearings to determine the needs of the
market and revise fees from time to time after a full study of market economics and consumer needs.230 Third, the government has
the resources to analyze the market, and to set fees which would
adequately compensate copyright owners without limiting consumer access to the copyrighted works because of artificially high
231
retail prices resulting from excessive royalty fees.

Market Controls
Until Congress decides upon a statutory solution to the videotape rental dispute, copyright owners must contend with the existing rental market which deprives copyright owners of royalties
each time a tape is rented. In 1981, Paramount Pictures/Paramount
Home Video acknowledged that 100 percent of retailers purchasing
its prerecorded video tapes were in the rental business. 232 A program of mark-ups on sales prices was instituted based upon the
rental potential of the movie. Mark-ups of 200 percent were witnessed by the retail video store owners. 233 Paramount surrendered
to the tape rental phenomenon and simply devised a system to compensate artists by projecting the estimated lost royalties on rentals
into the retail sales price of the prerecorded videotape. This tactic,
however, appears faulty upon closer analysis. Raising retail prices
of prerecorded tapes to such excessive prices would discourage consumers from purchasing films for their own home use. 234 The prac228. See supra text accompanying notes 152-216.
229. Id.
230. Rates for cable television are reviewed every five years. Record royalty
rates are reviewed every ten years, as are jukebox royalty fees. A five year
review period, commencing with 1982, was set for broadcasters. House Report,
supra note 8, at 112.
231. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal receives assistance from the Library of
Congress and experts in the field of copyright. Id.
232. Cheaper by the Dozen, supra note 82, at 268. As the Vice President of
Paramount Home Video, Richard Childs, stated: "We simply legitimized what
was going on ....
We sell the product with a price that includes rental royalties and the dealer does what he wishes. We've found, however, that 100 percent of our retailers are now in the rental business." Id. at 268 n. 46, citing,
Walter, Predict 322% Leap in ParamountSales, BILLBOARD, Jan. 1981, at 73.
233. Testimony of Elmer Cooper, supra note 7, at 695.
234. Tapes priced at $59 to $109 typically sell 14,000 copies. Conversely,
prices of $29.95 to $39.95 result in sales upwards of 150,000 copies. House Hearings: Ron Berger, supra note 96, at 904.
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tice simply guarantees an even greater consumer need for rental
tapes, and gives the video retail rental stores a solid hold on the
prerecorded tape rental market.
In late 1983, Paramount switched tactics. Instead of pricing the
prerecorded tapes based upon the anticipated lost royalties due to
rentals, the company decided to court the consumer. Tim Clott, of
Paramount Home Video, stated that the goal was a reasonably
priced tape to spur consumer sales. Royalties on the prerecorded
tapes would thus be collected on each tape based upon one sale,
rather than figuring the cost of lost royalties on rentals into the
235
retail price.
Thus, new releases from Paramount were priced at $29.95 and
$39.95. While a normal $80 prerecorded tape sells 30,000 copies,
sales of the new lower priced tapes have skyrocketed. 236 A Field
Research Corporation study revealed that 23 percent of all consumers were building tape libraries, either legally or illegally. 237 Paramount's move to give consumers reasonably priced prerecorded
238
tapes was an astute response to public demand.
CONCLUSION

The videotape rental controversy is one area in which case-bycase decisions will only confuse the questions and provide incomplete or unworkable answers. Although a work embodied on videotape can be copyrighted under the new Act, no statutory language
or congressional comment addresses the issues raised in the evolving home video industry. Existing statutory provisions, moreover,
offer little guidance. The case law and doctrines underlying the
first sale provisions of section 109(a) indicate that a purchaser who
takes title of a prerecorded videotape can dispose of or use the work
as he pleases. Conversely, if sequential renting of the same tape
falls within the definition of a public performance, copyright own235. Takiff, supra note 84.
236. February 1984 figures show that "Star Trek: The Wrath of Kahn" sold
150,000 copies, while "Flashdance" sold 250,000 copies. The popular "Raiders of
the Lost Ark" sold a remarkable 500,000 copies. Id. Because of the new reduced tape prices, sales now constitute 10 percent of the video retailer's business, as compared to 5 percent for the previous year. CONSUMER ELECTRONICS,
May 1984.
237. Saved by the Numbers, TIME, December 4, 1981, at 58.
238. Apparently, other motion picture studios are following Paramount's
lead. Warner Brothers released "Risky Business" with a $39.95 price tag.
Commtron Corporation Video Tape Price List, effective 2/01/84. Vestron released "Making of Michael Jackson's Thriller" at $29.95. Both have been highly
successful. Top Tapes, VIDEO REV., May 1984, at 64.
Consumers have responded favorably to the lower price tags. In 1983, 24
percent of all videotape consumers had purchased a prerecorded tape. This was
a six percent increase over consumer tape purchase in 1982. Bowden, supra
note 72.
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ers have the right to control the use of their works through
licensing.
Studios and retailers alike have urged Congress to clarify the
issue. Amending the first sale doctrine, as currently proposed, or
the public performance definition both offer workable solutions.
The problem lies in developing an adequate remedy to enforce the
licensing right. Studios can embark on a spree of litigation to obtain
damages from video retailers. Other alternatives include undertaking the monstrous task of developing licensing arrangements for
each store or assigning their rights to a performing rights or licensing society for monitoring and distributing royalties.
In the past, performing rights societies' blanket licensing agreements have been challenged as violative of the antitrust laws. The
Supreme Court softened the per se rule against price fixing in the
BMI case, holding that the unique market structures of the industry
require a society to enforce the copyright purposes of compensating
the copyright owner. A lower court subsequently rejected a series
of alternative pricing arrangements in favor of the blanket license.
Given this line of analysis, it appears unlikely that the new performing rights society will be dismantled on the basis of antitrust
violations.
Because the other alternatives present unanswered antitrust
questions, bookkeeping problems, and potential litigation costs,
compulsory licensing may be the least troublesome course. The
Copyright Royalty Tribunal can simply add another area of compulsory licensing to the four areas it already oversees. An impartial
governmental body would set and review fees to reflect market
prices and consumer needs.
The best solution, however, may simply be for studios to exercise sound business acumen. The home video industry is booming
and consumers are anxious to build home videotape libraries. Instead of placing affordable price tags on prerecorded videotapes to
meet consumer demands, however, studios set the high prices on
prerecorded tapes which contributed to the creation of the rental
market, which usurps royalties and studio profit. Paramount's
lower-priced line of videotapes resulted in successful sales records.
Perhaps other studios will feel some competitive pressure and adjust their retail prices. The rental market will probably never be
eliminated because consumers simply do not want to own a copy of
every film they may want to view. Competitive pricing, though, offers an attractive, workable solution at least until Congress resolves
the statutory questions.

